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INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
ICC AUTHORIZES PROSECUTOR’S 
REQUEST TO OPEN INVESTIGATION IN 
CÔTE D’IVOIRE
On October 3, 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber 
III of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) authorized Prosecutor Luis Moreno-
Ocampo’s request to open an investiga-
tion in Côte d’Ivoire. In his request, the 
Prosecutor sought authority to investigate 
crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction com-
mitted during Côte d’Ivoire’s post-election 
violence in 2010-2011 between forces 
loyal to incumbent President Alassane 
Ouattara and those loyal to now-ousted 
former President Laurent Gbagbo. Three 
thousand people were killed, 72 disap-
peared, 520 were arbitrarily detained, and 
100 cases of rape were reported. The 
authorization is based on a finding that the 
Prosecutor established a reasonable basis 
to believe that crimes within the jurisdic-
tion of the ICC had been committed by 
both pro-Ouattara and pro-Gbagbo forces. 
Though Côte d’Ivoire is not a State Party 
to the ICC, President Ouattara confirmed 
its acceptance of ICC jurisdiction, most 
recently in May 2011. Article 12(3) of 
the Rome Statute—the ICC’s founding 
treaty—allows non-States Parties to accept 
ICC jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis.
With elections for the next Chief 
Prosecutor approaching in December, the 
investigation presents one of Prosecutor 
Ocampo’s final opportunities to bolster 
the legitimacy of his office, strengthen its 
legacy, and provide a positive starting point 
for his successor. To do so, the Prosecutor 
must develop a coherent and well-executed 
investigation strategy that communicates 
the ICC’s mandate to victims and affected 
communities who seek justice, and sets 
the tone for the prosecution of perpetra-
tors throughout Côte d’Ivoire. In light of a 
recent report by Human Rights Watch, the 
investigation in Côte d’Ivoire has implica-
tions for the credibility of the ICC and 
presents an opportunity to improve on past 
techniques.
The report found that the absence of 
a well-communicated and coherent inves-
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tigative strategy within the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) threatened its indepen-
dence and impartiality during the course 
of investigations in the past. In these prior 
situations, the OTP failed to investigate all 
sides of a conflict or issued inconsistent 
charges for similar crimes. In other cases, 
it failed to trace responsibility for crimes to 
the higher levels of government. Together, 
these discrepancies foster perceptions that 
the ICC is not independent from govern-
ment control or that it favors one group 
over another. The failure to move forward 
with investigations of certain subjects cre-
ates an impression that they are inno-
cent, severely damaging the restorative 
efforts of affected communities who know 
these individuals to be responsible and had 
expected the Court to expose the truth.
In fulfilling its investigative mandate, 
the OTP must identify patterns of crimes 
and trace the chain of responsibility to indi-
viduals most responsible for the crimes. 
The principles of independence and impar-
tiality require the OTP to investigate alleged 
perpetrators on all sides, which in the situ-
ation in Côte d’Ivoire includes agents and 
forces loyal to President Ouattara, many 
of whom now occupy key government 
positions. Yet the OTP is highly dependent 
on government cooperation while inside a 
country to fulfill its document collection 
and witness interview obligations, which 
makes it difficult to effectively investigate 
and prosecute such upper-level individuals.
Prosecutor Ocampo must therefore 
demonstrate in his final months that he can 
strike a delicate balance in Côte d’Ivoire —
one that achieves the goals of impartiality 
and independence while maintaining the 
degree of state cooperation that is critical 
for a complete and thorough investiga-
tion. On one hand, the failure to carry out 
an impartial investigation of those most 
responsible from all parties to the conflict 
risks delivering the kind of “victor’s jus-
tice” that neglects victims and fails to deter 
those who might view crimes as a means 
to victory. On the other hand, the OTP 
must remain unbiased without alienating 
state officials; otherwise, those implicated 
may frustrate the investigation process 
out of self-interest, restricting access to 
evidence, witnesses, and affected com-
munities. Implicated officials might also 
threaten the safety of victims who wish to 
participate as witnesses.
The investigation in Côte d’Ivoire 
demands an independent and impartial 
approach to ensure not only that affected 
communities experience meaningful jus-
tice, but also that the ICC avoids costly 
perceptions of bias and maintains sup-
port from the international community in 
its efforts to confront impunity in future 
situations. The OTP can foster coopera-
tion by strictly adhering to core values 
of justice and fairness, which will attract 
allies within Côte d’Ivoire who are willing 
to collaborate. The OTP might also openly 
denounce non-cooperation to encourage 
the international community to exert pres-
sure on the state to fulfill its obligation to 
cooperate with the Court. In all, Prosecutor 
Ocampo must seize this opportunity, as the 
future of the Court may depend on it.
ICC APPEALS CHAMBER CONFIRMS 
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF CASES IN THE 
SITUATION OF KENYA
On August 30, 2011, the ICC Appeals 
Chamber confirmed the admissibility of 
The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, 
Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap 
Sang and The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and 
Mohammed Hussein Ali. These decisions 
underscore the ICC’s commitment to the 
principle of complementarity as outlined 
in Article 17(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, the 
founding document of the Court. Under 
Article 17, the Court may hear a case only 
after finding that a State with domestic 
jurisdiction is unwilling or unable to inves-
tigate or prosecute.
On March 31, 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber 
II granted the Office of the Prosecutor’s 
(OTP) request to open an investigation 
propio motu (“by its own volition”) into 
alleged crimes against humanity in Kenya, 
committed during the post-election vio-
lence that left approximately 1,100 people 
dead, 35,000 injured, and up to 600,000 
forcibly displaced in 2007-2008. On March 
8, 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber II issued sum-
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monses to appear for six Kenyan nationals 
accused of crimes against humanity under 
Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute.
On March 31, 2011, the government of 
Kenya, a State Party to the Rome Statute 
since 2005, filed applications challenging 
the admissibility of both cases. On May 30, 
2011, Pre-Trial Chamber II issued rejec-
tions to these applications, and on June 
6, 2011, the Kenyan government filed an 
appeal, citing Article 17(1)(a) of the Rome 
Statute. In filing its appeal, the Kenyan 
government argued that the Court had 
applied the incorrect standard to determine 
whether Kenya was fulfilling its duty to 
investigate the case under Article 17(1)(a), 
and that the Court had ignored or misin-
terpreted evidence that investigations were 
ongoing in Kenya.
On August 30, 2011, the Appeals 
Chamber rejected the appeal and con-
firmed the ruling of Pre-Trial Chamber 
II. In clarifying Article 17(1)(a), the Court 
ruled that the standard used to determine 
whether a case is being genuinely investi-
gated depends on the stage of the proceed-
ings. After issuing an arrest warrant or 
summons to appear, the Court applies the 
“same person/same conduct” test, which 
ascertains whether the state has itself taken 
concrete steps to determine whether the 
same individual is responsible for substan-
tially the same conduct as alleged in the 
case before the ICC. In the present case, 
the Court found that the Kenyan govern-
ment had failed to demonstrate that it had 
taken specific and concrete steps to investi-
gate the same individual and the same con-
duct, adding: “It is not sufficient merely to 
assert that investigations are ongoing.”
The Appeals Chamber’s decision is thus 
an affirmation of the principle of comple-
mentarity and a clear declaration that both 
cases will proceed within the jurisdic-
tion of the ICC. The Kenyan Section of 
the International Commission of Jurists 
has always supported ICC control of pro-
ceedings, arguing that Kenya needs to 
address issues such as poor political lead-
ership, judicial and police reforms, and the 
need for a more robust witness protection 
program before local justice mechanisms 
would be capable of trying these cases.
In its admissibility challenge, the 
Kenyan government addressed many of 
these issues by referencing reforms codi-
fied in the new Constitution, among them 
a Bill of Rights designed to strengthen 
fair trial rights, the creation of new offices 
and procedures to ensure judicial indepen-
dence, and the inclusion of Rome Statute 
crimes in national jurisdiction. The govern-
ment also laid out plans for a bottom-up 
investigative process that would focus first 
on suspects at a lower level, and then work 
its way up to the individuals charged before 
the ICC. Though the Pre-Trial Chamber II 
and the Appeals Chamber welcomed these 
measures, they stated that neither reforms 
nor plans for future investigations met 
the requirements to prove actual ongoing 
investigations of the same individuals and 
for the same conduct.
The Court’s decision confirming the 
admissibility of both cases in the situation 
in Kenya furthers the Court’s goal of pro-
viding an impartial forum for prosecution 
when national courts are found unwilling 
or unable to do so. To effectively fill this 
role, the Court’s responsibility extends 
beyond the proceedings to ensuring that 
the restorative effects of justice reach geo-
graphically distant victims and affected 
communities.With Kenya’s 2012 elections 
approaching, the proceedings send a strong
message to potential perpetrators of vio-
lence and to the international community 
at large that the ICC is standing by to 
investigate and, if necessary, prosecute 
should Kenya again experience violence. 
The principle of complementarity allows 
for the truth behind alleged crimes to be 
revealed, one way or another.
Claire Grandison, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers the International Criminal 
Court for the Human Rights Brief.
AD HOC TRIBUNALS
REPUBLIC OF RWANDA RECEIVES FIRST 
REFERRAL CASE FROM ICTR
On June 28, 2011, the United Nations 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) announced its referral of the 
first war crimes case, that of Jean-Bosco 
Uwinkindi, to the Republic of Rwanda. 
This comes after many years of determined 
efforts by the Rwandan government to 
create an impartial court system that is 
capable of detaining, representing, and try-
ing indicted persons under internationally 
recognized standards. While the referral 
is not a carte blanche endorsement of the 
Rwandan judicial system, it indicates cau-
tious approval of Rwanda’s efforts thus far 
to align its judicial system to international 
standards, and will be a litmus test for 
future referrals, which could ease the case-
load of the ICTR in compliance with the 
goals of its Completion Strategy.
The ICTR modeled its referral process 
after the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which 
has successfully referred thirteen cases to 
national jurisdictions. As set forth in UN 
Resolution 1503 (2003), a culminating ele-
ment of the ICTR’s Completion Strategy 
is empowering national judicial systems 
to promote the rule of law. When a state 
maintains a level of juridical competence 
that protects the rights of the accused, per 
Article 20 of the ICTR Statute, the ICTR 
may facilitate the transfer the cases of 
intermediate and lower-rank individuals. 
Article 20 requires that the accused have 
equality before the court, a fair and public 
hearing, a presumption of innocence, and 
minimum guarantees of fairness during 
trial. The referral process then falls under 
Rule 11 bis of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence for the ICTR, which requires 
that a specially designated Trial Chamber 
assess the state’s compliance with Article 
20. The state must have a penal code 
and penalty structure in line with ICTR 
standards, which includes prohibiting the 
death penalty for all referred cases, pro-
tecting witnesses, and providing adequate 
detention facilities. After granting a refer-
ral order, the ICTR transfers prosecution 
materials and the accused to the state, and 
may order observers to monitor and report 
on the proceedings and facilities, revoking 
the referral at any time prior to judgment 
if necessary.
To aid in the Uwinkindi referral deci-
sion, the ICTR Trial Chamber accepted 
amicus curiae briefs from the Rwandan 
Government and several non-governmental 
organizations. The organizations expressed 
concerns that Rwandan practices do not 
always respect written law. For example, 
in a radio interview after Uwinkindi’s 
arrest, Rwanda’s Minister of Justice vio-
lated Uwinkindi’s right to presumption 
of innocence, saying he “would be a big 
catch” since he was “high up in the hierar-
chy” for planning and executing genocide. 
Further, the briefs noted that the public 
announcement of Uwinkindi’s conviction 
in absentia by a Rwandan Gacaca Court 
in 2009 would make witnesses reluctant 
to testify, even though the conviction was 
vacated. These concerns are particularly 
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relevant, as five prior ICTR referral appli-
cations were denied for similar concerns, 
including capital punishment, detention 
conditions, and witness protection.
However, the amicus briefs also illus-
trate Rwanda’s significant leaps forward. 
In 2007, Rwanda abolished the death pen-
alty, and has since adopted and amended 
Transfer Laws for accepting cases from 
the ICTR, according the accused a pre-
sumption of innocence, bringing deten-
tion facilities in line with UN General 
Assembly Resolution 43/173, and estab-
lishing witness protection standards. Two 
witness protection programs now provide 
immunity for testimony. Some witnesses 
still express fear of being targeted should 
they testify, but they now have the option to 
testify via video link, deposition, or before 
a judge in another state.
These new witness protection measures 
reflect a reinforced standard of judicial 
fairness, providing for valuable testimony 
that might otherwise be unavailable for 
fear of reprisal. Moreover, Rwanda can 
now draw from its own experience with 
genocide trials in its local Gacaca courts 
and its High Court.
While Rwanda must continue to address 
the concerns of the amicus briefs, the 
ICTR is satisfied that the new measures 
will ensure Uwinkindi has a fair trial. 
The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, an independent organiza-
tion affirmed by the Trial Chambers, will 
monitor the effectiveness of the new mea-
sures throughout the trial, ideally mitigat-
ing the risk of an unfair trial. In their own 
amicus brief, the Rwandan Government 
states that until the Transfer Laws have 
been tested by cases from the ICTR, they 
deserve a presumption of good faith, and 
this is exactly what the ICTR has given 
them.
FINAL ICTY FUGITIVE CAPTURED: 
WHAT’S NEXT?
The July 20, 2011 announcement of 
the arrest of Goran Hadži , the last of 
161 persons indicted by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), marks a turning point 
in the Tribunal’s mission. The Tribunal 
was established as an ad hoc judiciary, 
contingent upon the restoration of peace 
in the region in accordance with United 
Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 
803 (1993). Accordingly, in response to the 
demonstrated judicial competence of the 
countries that emerged from the former 
Yugoslavia, the ICTY began to implement 
its Completion Strategy in 2003, no longer 
adding cases to its docket after 2004. The 
Completion Strategy, as adopted by the 
UN Security Council, requires that the 
ICTY focus its efforts on the formidable 
task of building in-country judicial capac-
ity, working with and dependent on the 
national judiciaries.
Passing the torch of the ICTY to coun-
tries in the former Yugoslavia is a two-
pronged effort. First, as outlined in UN 
Resolution 1534 (2004), the ICTY and 
the international community must work 
to build the capacity of national courts to 
try war crimes cases fairly and effectively. 
Intricately bound with this task is the sec-
ond: the transfer of the vast amount of legal 
documentation, evidence, rules of evidence 
and procedure, and specialized experience 
from the ICTY to the countries of the for-
mer Yugoslavia.
As set forth in UN Resolution 1503 
(2003), a culminating element of the 
ICTR’s Completion Strategy is empower-
ing national judicial systems to promote 
the rule of law. The principal effort in this 
regard is the War Crimes Justice Project 
(WCJP). A joint effort of the ICTY, the 
Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights at the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE/ODIHR), and the United Nations 
Interregional Crime and Justice Research 
Institute (UNICRI), with 4 million of 
funding from the European Union (EU), 
the WCJP formed in late 2010 after a nine-
month needs assessment to facilitate the 
transfer of the ICTY’s skills and resources. 
To meet the identified needs, the WCJP 
performs several functions. First, it trans-
lates key proceedings from the ICTY into 
Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian. In total, 
60,000 pages will be translated by the 
end of 2011. Second, the WCJP has coor-
dinated thirty-one professional develop-
ment sessions in the former Yugoslavia for 
legal professionals, judges, and prosecu-
tors on various jurisprudential principles 
embraced by the Tribunal, while acquaint-
ing the countries with the Tribunal’s legal 
research tools. The ICTY has also hosted 
local forums for judges to exchange exper-
tise on legal challenges and procedural 
tools. Finally, the WCJP is working with 
the OSCE to develop country-specific cur-
ricula on international humanitarian law 
tailored to each legal system, training 
instructors to continue the WCJP’s work 
autonomously. Ultimately, the WCJP will 
make a compilation of legal precedent 
available for war crimes trials in the for-
mer Yugoslavia, and provide the tools and 
expertise necessary for local professionals 
to use it effectively.
Transferring the work of the ICTY both 
demands and enables a competent national 
judiciary. Several specialized chambers for 
war crimes prosecution within the former 
Yugoslavia now provide direct counter-
parts with which the ICTY can work. The 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the 
cooperation of the ICTY, formed a War 
Crimes Chamber that has successfully tried 
and convicted war criminals under its own 
criminal code. Ten indicted individuals 
have been transferred to this court from the 
ICTY. Croatia is still undergoing massive 
judicial reform, but has made considerable 
progress, establishing war crimes cham-
bers in county courts. In 2003, Croatia 
adopted new witness protection laws, 
and in 2005 it added a department in its 
Ministry of Justice to work with witnesses 
of war crimes. To date, Croatia has tried 
one transferred case from the ICTY, and 
it is working with the ICTY to prosecute 
others locally. Serbia has also made sig-
nificant progress, setting up a War Crimes 
Chamber, and working with the ICTY on 
transfer cases. Through the Office of the 
War Crimes Prosecutor, Serbia now issues 
its own indictments and convictions, suc-
cessfully prosecuting 383 persons to date.
The greatest substantive contribution 
of the ICTY to the former Yugoslavia and 
the rest of the world is the vast amount 
of precedent for international war crimes 
adjudication. The international commu-
nity, and in particular the International 
Criminal Court and other ad hoc tribunals, 
will continue to interpret and build on this 
precedent. However, the separate proce-
dural contribution of the ICTY exempli-
fied in these capacity building efforts is a 
success in its own right. It will ultimately 
increase trust in the competence of national 
judiciaries to try war criminals under the 
same standards of fairness and impartiality 
promoted by the ICTY.
Benjamin Watson, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers the Ad Hoc Tribunals for the 
Human Rights Brief.
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JUDGMENT SUMMARIES: INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
THE PROSECUTOR V. NYIRAMASUHUKO, 
ET AL., TRIAL JUDGMENT, CASE NO. 
ICTR-98-42-T
On June 24, 2011, Trial Chamber II 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda issued its approximately 1500 
page judgment in the case commonly 
known as the “Butare Trial,” against six 
Rwandans who held positions of authority 
in the préfecture of Butare in Rwanda dur-
ing the 1994 genocide. The six accused—
Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, Arsène Shalom 
Ntahobali, Sylvain Nsabimana, Alphonse 
Nteziryayo, Joseph Kanyabashi, and Elie 
Ndayambaje—was each convicted of geno-
cide based on his or her role in helping to 
formulate and implement a government 
plan to massacre the Tutsis in Butare, 
one of the most populated préfectures in 
Rwanda, and the area with the highest 
percentage of Tutsis. Among the other 
charges on which the accused were con-
victed were conspiracy to commit genocide 
(Nyiramasuhuko), direct and public incite-
ment to commit genocide (Nteziryayo, 
Kanyabashi, and Ndayambaje), exter-
mination as a crime against humanity 
(Nyiramasuhuko, Ntahobali, Kanyabashi, 
and Ndayambaje), rape as a crime against 
humanity (Nyiramasuhuko and Ntahobali), 
persecution as a crime against humanity 
(Nyiramasuhuko, Ntahobali, Nsabimana, 
Kanyabashi, and Ndayambaje), vio-
lence to life, health, and the physical or 
mental well-being of persons as a war 
crime (Nyiramasuhuko, Nsabimana, 
Kanyabashi, and Ndayambaje), and out-
rages upon personal dignity as a war crime 
(Nyiramasuhuko and Ntahobali). Each was 
acquitted of other inhumane acts as a 
crime against humanity, either because the 
underlying acts forming the basis for the 
charge fell “squarely within other crimes 
against humanity” for which the accused 
was convicted, or did not rise to the level 
of crimes against humanity. The Chamber 
sentenced Nyiramasuhuko, Ntahobali, 
and Ndayambaje to life imprisonment, 
Nsabimana to twenty-five years’ imprison-
ment, Nteziryayo to thirty years’ imprison-
ment, and Kanyabashi to thirty-five years’ 
imprisonment.
The Butare Trial and judgment are 
notable for a number of reasons. First, the 
trial was particularly lengthy and complex, 
lasting ten years and involving the creation 
of more than 125,000 transcript pages, 
the production of approximately 13,000 
pages of documents into evidence, and 
the testimony of 189 witnesses. Due to the 
lengthy nature of the trial, several of the 
accused either filed separate motions with 
the Chamber arguing that their rights to be 
tried without undue delay had been vio-
lated, or raised this claim in their closing 
arguments to the Chamber. However, the 
Chamber dismissed these claims, explain-
ing that what constitutes “undue” delay is 
determined on case-by-case basis by look-
ing at the length of delay, the complexity 
of proceedings, the conduct of parties, 
the conduct of legal authorities, and any 
prejudice which accrued to the accused 
as a result. Referencing its decisions in 
Nahimana, et al. and Bagosara, et al., in 
which the Chamber had found that deten-
tion of more than seven-and-a-half years 
and eleven years, respectively, were not 
“undue” because of the complexity of 
the cases, the Chamber reached a similar 
conclusion with respect to the Butare Trial, 
stressing not only the large number of wit-
nesses, but also the fact that six different 
defense teams had to cross-examine each 
witness and present its own case.
Another notable feature of the Butare 
Trial and judgment is that Pauline 
Nyiramasuhuko, the former Minister of 
Family and Women’s Development in 
Rwanda, was the first female accused to be 
brought before any international criminal 
tribunal, as well as the first woman to be 
convicted of genocide and rape—both as 
a crime against humanity and as the war 
crime of outrages upon personal dignity—
in any international criminal tribunal. In 
regard to the charges of rape, the Trial 
Chamber convicted both Nyiramasuhuko 
and her son, Ntahobali, who was a student 
and part-time manager of Hotel Ihuliro 
during the 1994 genocide, of bearing supe-
rior responsibility for the rapes of a num-
ber of Tutsi refugees who had taken shelter 
at the Butare Préfecture Office (BPO). 
Specifically, the Chamber found that 
Nyiramasuhuko brought Interhamwe sol-
diers who were under her effective control 
to the BPO and, in many cases, ordered the 
soldiers to rape Tutsi women before load-
ing them onto trucks and taking them to 
various places in Butare to be killed. Given 
the fact that the Chamber found that the 
evidence established Nyiramasuhuko had 
ordered the rapes, the Chamber expressed 
the view that the Prosecution had made 
a “serious omission” by failing to charge 
her with both direct and superior respon-
sibility for rape. By contrast, Ntahobali 
was convicted of rape as a crime against
humanity and as the war crime of outrages 
upon personal dignity not only as a supe-
rior, but also for his role as a principal 
perpetrator of rapes against several women, 
and for ordering and aiding and abetting 
the rape and gang rapes of Tutsi women. 
The Chamber also repeatedly admonished 
the Prosecution for its failure to ade-
quately plead rape as genocide, noting 
that while rape featured prominently in the 
Prosecution’s Indictment, it was pled only
as a crime against humanity and the war
crime of outrages upon personal dignity. 
Furthermore, the Chamber found that the 
Prosecution failed to cure the defective 
pleading through its Pre-Trial Brief and 
Opening Statement. Thus, although the 
Chamber found that the evidence estab-
lished that the bodily and mental harm 
inflicted by the rapes perpetrated or sup-
ported by the accused was “of such a seri-
ous nature as to threaten the destruction in 
whole or in part of the Tutsi ethnic group,” 
it could not consider the acts of rape in sup-
port of the charges of genocide. Notably, 
the Chamber did discuss the evidence 
presented at trial regarding acts of rape in 
the course of its findings on genocide in 
order to convey the entire set of facts in a 
coherent fashion, but noted each time that 
the rapes were not taken into account when 
assessing genocide.
Yet another interesting facet of 
the Butare Trial judgment is the Trial 
Chamber’s finding that Nsabimana, who 
was préfet of Butare during the relevant 
events, aided and abetted crimes commit-
ted at the Butare Préfecture Office through 
his failure to fulfill his legal duty to pre-
vent the crimes. Specifically, the Chamber 
convicted Nsabimana of aiding and abet-
ting genocide, extermination and persecu-
tion as crimes against humanity, and the 
war crime of violence to life, health, and 
the physical or mental well-being of per-
sons based on its finding that he had a legal 
duty to prevent the killing of Tutsis taking 
refuge at the BPO. The Chamber began its 
analysis of Nsabimana’s liability by stat-
ing that an accused may be responsible for 
aiding and abetting in two different ways: 
(i) by positive acts, including providing 
tacit approval and encouragement; or (ii) 
by omission, namely failing to discharge 
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a legal duty to act. While the first form 
of aiding and abetting liability seems to 
require the presence of the accused at or 
near the scene of the crime, the Chamber 
explained, the latter only requires that the 
accused had the ability to fulfill his or her 
duty; that the failure of the accused to do so 
assisted, encouraged, or lent moral support 
to the perpetration of a crime; and that the 
failure to act had a substantial impact on 
the realization of that crime. Thus, the fact 
that Nsabimana was not present at the BPO 
when the attacks that formed the basis for 
the charges against him were committed 
did not preclude the Chamber from find-
ing him responsible as an aider and abettor. 
In terms of his legal obligation to prevent 
the attacks at the BPO, the Chamber first 
explained that the Rwandan Penal Code 
imposes a general obligation on every 
citizen to provide assistance to persons in 
danger and provides that failure to do so is 
a criminal offense. While recognizing that 
the Code also provides that a risk to oneself 
may serve as justification for a failure to 
act, the Chamber held that the danger to 
any one person in a position of authority 
does not outweigh the violence suffered 
by thousands of people that “affects… [h]
umanity as a whole.” The Chamber also 
found that Rwandan domestic law required 
Nsabimana, as préfet, to ensure the security 
of people within the Butare préfecture. 
Lastly, the Chamber noted that the laws 
and customs of war imposed a legal duty 
to protect civilians against acts or threats of 
violence, citing in particular to provisions 
of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva 
Conventions. With respect to Nsabimana’s 
assistance to, and substantial effect on, 
the perpetration of crimes at the BPO, the 
Chamber noted that many people took 
refuge at the BPO precisely because they 
believed that the préfet would help them, 
but in reality, Nsabimana not only failed to 
intervene, but directly declined requests for 
assistance. The Chamber also stressed that, 
when Nsabimana did eventually requisition 
forces to stand guard at the BPO in early- 
to mid-June 1994, further attacks were 
prevented. Had he taken such action earlier 
in time, the Chamber concluded, he could 
have prevented, at least in part, crimes that 
the Chamber characterized as “among the 
worst” recounted before the ICTR.
Brynn Weinstein, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, wrote this judgment summary 
for the Human Rights Brief. Katherine 
Anne Cleary, Assistant Director of the War 
Crimes Research Office, edited this sum-
mary for the Human Rights Brief.
THE PROSECUTOR V. JEAN-BAPTISTE 
GATETE, TRIAL JUDGMENT, CASE NO. 
ICTR-2000-61-T
Trial Chamber III of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda issued 
its judgment in the case against Jean-
Baptiste Gatete on March 31, 2011. Gatete, 
who was a prominent member of the 
Hutu-dominated National Revolutionary 
Movement for Development of Rwanda 
and served as the director of the Ministry 
of Women and Family Affairs during the 
country’s 1994 genocide, was found guilty 
of genocide and extermination as a crime 
against humanity, resulting in a single sen-
tence of life imprisonment. The Chamber 
ruled that he was responsible for the 
deaths of hundreds—if not thousands—of 
Rwanda’s Tutsis based on his role organiz-
ing and coordinating mass killings by dis-
tributing weapons and ordering members 
of the Interahamawe, a civilian militia, 
to carry out extensive assaults on Tutsis. 
Although the Prosecution also charged 
Gatete with rape as a crime against human-
ity based on a number of alleged incidents 
in which the accused ordered members of 
the Interahamwe to rape Tutsis, the Trial 
Chamber determined with respect to each 
of these incidents that the Prosecution had 
failed to establish Gatete’s responsibility 
for the rapes beyond a reasonable doubt 
and thus Gatete was acquitted of rape as a 
crime against humanity.
Along with challenging the Prosecution’s 
evidence relating to the charges against 
him, Gatete’s Defense team raised a num-
ber of challenges relating to the fairness 
of proceedings. First, the Defense argued 
that Gatete’s right to trial without undue 
delay had been violated, given that he was 
arrested on September 11, 2002 and over 
seven years lapsed before his trial com-
menced on October 20, 2009. In address-
ing this challenge, the Chamber noted that 
the right to be tried without undue delay 
is established by Article 20 (4)(c) of the 
statute of the ICTR and that a number of 
factors are relevant in determining whether 
a delay was undue, including: “(a) the 
length of the delay; (b) the complexity of 
the proceedings…; (c) the conduct of the 
parties; (d) the conduct of the authori-
ties involved; and (e) the prejudice to the 
accused...” The Chamber weighs these fac-
tors on a case-by-case basis, and considers 
the totality of circumstances surrounding 
the undue delay. Turning to the case before 
it, the Chamber first recognized that the 
pre-trial delay of over seven years was sub-
stantial. However, the Chamber balanced 
the length of the delay with the other fac-
tors mentioned above. Regarding the com-
plexity of the proceedings, the Chamber 
considered multiple sub-factors including 
“the number of accused, the number of 
witnesses, the quantity of the evidence, and 
the complexity of the facts and of the law.” 
While the case involved only one accused, 
the Chamber stressed that, together, the 
Prosecution and Defense called forty-nine 
witnesses before the Chamber and pre-
sented 146 exhibits. There was also an evi-
dentiary on-site visit to Rwanda. Moreover, 
the Chamber noted that the allegations of 
genocide, complicity in genocide, con-
spiracy to commit genocide, and the crimes 
against humanity of extermination, murder, 
and rape involved complex issues of law 
and fact. Moreover, while the Chamber did 
cite to “instances of delay on the part of the 
Prosecution” for which the Chamber found 
no justification, it also determined that the 
accused suffered no prejudice as a result 
of these delays. Indeed, in the opinion of 
the Chamber, the Defense’s failure to chal-
lenge the length of proceedings until its 
Closing Brief demonstrated that there was 
minimal—if any—prejudice as a conse-
quence of the delay. Finally, the Chamber 
stressed that, once the trial commenced, it 
was conducted extremely expeditiously. In 
sum, the Chamber ruled that, after consid-
ering the above factors, Gatete’s right to 
trial without undue delay was not violated.
The Defense also argued that the dis-
closure of the identities of a number of pro-
tected witnesses only thirty days prior to 
the start of trial adversely affected Gatete’s 
ability to prepare his defence pursuant to 
Article 20(4)(b) of the ICTR Statute. In 
response, the Trial Chamber noted not only 
that it had a statutory duty to “provide for 
the protection of victims and witnesses,” 
but also that the Pre-Trial Chamber had 
determined that the Prosecution had pre-
sented “persuasive evidence of the vola-
tile security situation in Rwanda and of 
potential threats against Rwandans living 
in other countries, which could give rise 
to a justified and real fear that disclosure 
of their participation in the Tribunal’s pro-
ceedings would threaten their safety and 
84823_AU_HRB.indd  40 12/7/11  2:16 PM
5
Grandison et al.: Updates from the International and Internationalized Criminal Cou
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011
41
security.” The Chamber also stressed that 
the Defense was not alleging that the deci-
sion to grant protective measures was an 
abuse of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s discre-
tion. Finally, the Chamber noted that the 
Defense had failed to demonstrate how the 
fact that the identities were not disclosed 
until thirty days before the start of trial 
harmed its preparation. As a result, the 
Chamber dismissed the claim.
Lastly, the Defense argued that Gatete’s 
right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the 
fact that eight out of the thirty days of 
trial proceedings were conducted in the 
absence of one of the three Trial Chamber 
judges. While recognizing that Rule 15bis 
of the ICTR’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence permits the Trial Chamber to 
hold proceedings in the absence of a judge 
where the interests of justice require, the 
Defense argued that Gatete suffered preju-
dice because: (i) the testimony of twelve 
witnesses had to be viewed by the absent 
judge by way of video-recording, which 
does not allow for the same assessment of a 
witness’s credibility as live testimony; and 
(ii) the absence of one judge “has an impact 
on the level of questioning from the Bench 
during trial.” The Trial Chamber rejected 
the claim of prejudice, however, noting that 
the Defense had not demonstrated that the 
remaining judges of the Chamber abused 
their discretion under Rule 15bis in deter-
mining that the interests of justice required 
a continuation of the trial. Furthermore, 
the Chamber noted that, while the prefer-
ence is for each judge to hear live testi-
mony from witnesses, there is no absolute 
requirement that testimony be presented 
in such a manner, and in any event, a wit-
ness’s in-court demeanor is not the sole 
factor relevant to determining credibility. 
Finally, the Chamber highlighted the fact 
that the Defense had not raised objections 
to the continuation of proceedings pursuant 
to Rule 15bis at the time and that it did not 
move to recall any witnesses following the 
return of the absent judge.
Having dismissed the Defense’s claims 
regarding Gatete’s fair trial rights, the 
Chamber went on to evaluate the charges 
against Gatete and determined, as men-
tioned above, that he bore responsibility for 
the crimes of genocide and extermination 
as a crime against humanity. In sentenc-
ing Gatete, the Chamber considered the 
gravity of the offenses with which he was 
convicted, as well as aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances, and decided upon a 
single sentence of thirty years.
Adam Dembling, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, wrote this judgment summary 
for the Human Rights Brief. Katherine 
Anne Cleary, Assistant Director of the War 
Crimes Research Office, edited this sum-
mary for the Human Rights Brief.
THARCISSE RENZAHO V. THE 
PROSECUTOR, APPEALS JUDGMENT, 
CASE NO. ICTR-97-31-A
On April 1, 2011, the Appeals Chamber 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda issued its judgment in the case 
against Tharcisse Renzaho, préfect of 
Kigali-Ville préfecture and a colonel in the 
Rwandan army during the 1994 genocide. 
The Trial Chamber had convicted Renzaho 
of genocide, murder and rape as crimes 
against humanity, and murder and rape as 
serious violations of Article 3 common to 
the Geneva Conventions and of Additional 
Protocol II, sentencing him to life impris-
onment. Although the Appeals Chamber 
granted two of Renzaho’s thirteen grounds 
of appeal, it affirmed the Trial Chamber’s 
life sentence.
The first of Renzaho’s two success-
ful grounds of appeal related to the Trial 
Chamber’s decision to convict him of geno-
cide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes on the basis of his superior respon-
sibility for repeated acts of rape commit-
ted against three women by Interahamwe, 
policemen, and soldiers in the Rugenge 
sector of Kigali-Ville. Specifically, 
Renzaho argued that the Trial Chamber 
convicted him of on the basis of facts not 
properly pleaded in the Indictment, which, 
according to Renzaho, lacked detailed 
information regarding the dates, locations, 
and names of the victims and perpetrators 
underlying the Prosecution’s rape charges. 
The Prosecution contended that although 
the Rugenge sector was not expressly men-
tioned in the Indictment, the Indictment 
alleged that between April and July 1994, 
Renzaho’s subordinates raped Tutsi women 
and girls throughout Kigali-Ville and 
forced them to perform sexual acts in 
exchange for their safety. Additionally, 
the Prosecution argued that Renzaho 
received clear, consistent, and timely infor-
mation detailing the factual basis of the 
rape charges against him by way of the 
Prosecution’s Pre-Trial Brief. In review-
ing these claims, the Appeals Chamber 
began by recalling that, because Renzaho 
was charged as a superior under Article 
6(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal, four 
categories of the material facts must have 
been pleaded in the Indictment: (i) facts 
establishing that Renzaho was the superior 
of sufficiently identified subordinates over 
whom he had effective control and for 
whose acts he was alleged to be respon-
sible; (ii) facts describing the criminal acts 
committed by those for whom Renzaho 
was alleged to be responsible; (iii) facts 
establishing that the accused knew or had 
reason to know of the criminal acts; and 
(iv) facts establishing that Renzaho failed 
to take necessary and reasonable measures 
to prevent the criminal acts or to punish the 
persons who committed them. Ultimately, 
the Appeals Chamber determined that the 
Indictment was defective because it failed 
to plead the facts establishing that Renzaho 
knew or had reason to know of the rapes 
forming the basis for the charges. It also 
found that the Prosecution’s Pre-Trial Brief 
failed to cure the defect because it did not 
clearly indicate that Renzaho’s encourage-
ment of the rapes was the key fact that 
formed the basis for his criminal liability 
as a superior. Finally, the Appeals Chamber 
concluded that the defective pleading 
constituted a prejudice against Renzaho 
because his ability to prepare his defense 
was materially impaired. During the trial, 
Renzaho’s defense did not understand that 
the encouragement of the rapes was a key 
element to the Prosecution’s case and, thus, 
did not appropriately object to a witness’s 
testimony stating that Renzaho encour-
aged the rapes. Therefore, the Appeals 
Chamber held that the Trial Chamber erred 
in convicting Renzaho and reversed his 
convictions for genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes to the extent the 
convictions were based on these rapes.
The Appeals Chamber, by majority, 
also partially granted Renzaho’s fifth 
ground of appeal, which raised several 
challenges to the Trial Chamber’s finding 
that Renzaho was guilty of genocide based 
on killings that occurred at roadblocks 
set up throughout Kigali-Ville. In par-
ticular, a majority of the Appeals Chamber 
was persuaded by Renzaho’s challenge to 
the Trial Chamber’s finding, by way of 
inference, that he ordered the killing of 
Tutsis at roadblocks. The Trial Chamber 
had reached this conclusion, despite the 
84823_AU_HRB.indd  41 12/7/11  2:16 PM
6
Human Rights Brief, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/vol19/iss1/7
42
fact that there was no explicit evidence 
that Renzaho had ordered the killings, by 
noting that the evidence established that 
Renzaho had ordered the establishment of 
the roadblocks, facilitated the acquisition
of weapons for distribution to the civilian 
population, and sanctioned the killings at 
the roadblocks. Based on this evidence, 
the Trial Chamber concluded that Renzaho 
“must have equally” ordered the killings 
at roadblocks. In reviewing this finding, 
the Appeals Chamber first recalled that, 
while ordering, as a mode of responsibil-
ity, can be inferred from circumstantial 
evidence, it must be the only reasonable 
inference available. Here, the majority held 
that the Trial Chamber failed to explain 
how the conclusion that Renzaho gave an 
order to kill Tutsis at roadblocks was the 
only reasonable inference to draw from 
the evidence. Furthermore, the majority 
noted, the conclusion that Renzaho gave 
an order to kill at the roadblocks would 
be an insufficient basis on which to base 
a conviction for ordering, as the Trial 
Chamber made no findings “concerning 
when or where Renzaho gave the order, to 
whom or to what category of perpetrators 
he gave the order, and whether Renzaho 
was in a position of authority vis-à-vis 
the recipient.” Hence, while upholding the 
Trial Chamber’s conviction of Renzaho 
of genocide based on aiding and abetting 
the killings at the roadblocks, the majority 
reversed the lower court’s conviction for 
genocide based on ordering these same 
killings.
Judge Güney and Judge Pocar dis-
sented on this point. Judge Güney stated 
that although he agreed that the conviction 
was not secured for reasons put forth by 
the majority, he believed that other factual 
findings in the Trial Judgment supported 
the conviction of genocide for ordering the 
killing at roadblocks. He argued that the 
Trial Chamber found “beyond reasonable 
doubt” that Renzaho ordered the establish-
ment of roadblocks during April 1994, was 
aware of the likelihood that killings would 
be committed there, and shared the “geno-
cidal intent of the assailants at roadblocks.” 
For his part, Judge Pocar disagreed with 
both the reasoning and the conclusion 
of the majority opinion. He believed the 
majority ignored the fact that Renzaho 
ordered the establishment of roadblocks 
and made other public statements knowing 
that the continued killing of Tutsis was a 
likely outcome. Based on these facts, Judge 
Pocar stated that the Trial Chamber deter-
mined that Renzaho acted with knowledge 
of the genocidal intent of the assailants at 
roadblocks, an intent Renzaho also shared, 
and had not erred in its conviction of 
Renzaho based on his role in ordering the 
killings of Tutsis at roadblocks.
In terms of sentencing, the Appeals 
Chamber noted that its reversals of the 
Trial Chamber’s convictions for genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes
based on acts of rape and for genocide 
based on the ordering of killings of Tutsis 
at roadblocks “concern[ed] very seri-
ous crimes” and that, in some cases, the 
Appeals Chamber has “considered rever-
sals as reason to review and reduce the 
sentence.” However, noting that it had 
affirmed Renzaho’s convictions for geno-
cide, murder as a crime against humanity, 
and murder as a war crime based on other 
acts, the Appeals Chamber concluded that 
its reversals did not impact the sentence 
imposed by the Trial Chamber.
Yaritza Velez, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, wrote this judgment summary 
for the Human Rights Brief. Katherine 
Anne Cleary, Assistant Director of the War 
Crimes Research Office, edited this sum-
mary for the Human Rights Brief.
INTERNATIONALIZED TRIBUNALS
THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON 
DEFINES TERRORISM
On May 30, 2007, the United Nations, 
by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1757, 
convened the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
(STL) to prosecute individuals accused of 
committing the attacks on February 14, 
2005 that killed former Lebanese Prime 
Minister Rafiq Hariri and others. Article 
2 of Resolution 1757 specified that the 
tribunal must apply the Lebanese Criminal 
Code for crimes of terrorism. Although the 
STL is mandated to apply Lebanese law in 
its proceedings, the Appeals Chamber of 
the STL issued an interlocutory decision 
in which it held that the STL could apply 
international law related to the defini-
tion of terrorism to which Lebanon is 
bound. The Appeals Chamber referenced 
the Arab Convention for the Suppression 
of Terrorism (Convention), articulated a 
customary international definition of ter-
rorism, and explained how the STL is not 
limited by Lebanese case law as it applies 
the Lebanese Criminal Code related to ter-
rorism. This is the first internationalized 
tribunal to try crimes of terrorism. Thus, 
the decisions regarding what constitutes a 
crime of terrorism could impact how other 
countries prosecute individuals accused of 
committing acts of terrorism.
Article 314 of the Lebanese Criminal 
Code defines terrorist acts as “acts intended 
to cause a state of terror and committed by 
means liable to create a public danger 
such as explosive devices, inflammable 
materials, toxic or corrosive products and 
infectious or microbial agents.” Thus, the 
Lebanese code narrowly defines a terror-
ist act as one requiring use of some means 
likely to create a public danger. For exam-
ple, a murder committed with the inten-
tion to terrorize the population may not 
meet the statute’s requirements if the court 
decides that the means used did not create 
a public danger.
In articulating international definitions 
of terrorism, the STL looks to the Arab 
Convention, to which Lebanon is a State 
Party, as well as customary international 
law. The Convention does not specify the 
means of a terrorist act, but does assert 
that the act must be violent in nature. The 
STL then turns to other international law 
to articulate a customary definition of 
terrorism by looking to state practice and 
international treaties. The STL states that, 
through the lens of customary international 
law, an act is considered terrorism if, in 
times of peace, the actor creates a public 
danger with the intent to spread fear, and 
the act has a transnational element or 
effect. By bringing the Lebanese and inter-
national definitions of terrorism together, 
and by regarding the list of means enumer-
ated in the Lebanese Criminal Code as 
non-inclusive, the court broadly interprets 
Lebanon’s means requirement. Lebanon’s 
requirement of a danger to the public is 
still part of the definition of a terrorist act 
that the STL will apply, but the danger cre-
ated need not arise from the specific means 
used to commit the terrorist act. Rather, the 
danger can be the violence that the act has 
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the potential to encourage and create. Thus, 
the STL will interpret an act of terrorism to 
require an intentional commission of an act 
through any means likely to create a public 
danger, and the intent to create and cause a 
state of fear and terror.
While the STL has yet to hear a case, 
its interlocutory decision defining terror-
ism and subsequent cases applying this 
definition could have a lasting impact 
both in Lebanon and the greater interna-
tional community. As this will be the first 
instance in which an act of terrorism is 
tried in an internationalized venue, the 
future opinions issued by the STL could 
become important persuasive authority for 
other Lebanese courts, and for other inter-
national and domestic courts, prosecuting 
acts of terrorism. The international com-
munity has struggled to clearly define 
terrorism, and has instead relied on various 
anti-terrorism conventions. The definition 
of terrorism articulated by the STL could 
serve as a “gap filler” for other interna-
tional bodies as they also wrestle with the 
challenge of defining terrorism and the 
legal consequences of such a definition. 
As trials commence, the application of 
the STL’s definition will further clarify the 
legal requirements of terrorism, and the 
ramifications for both the prosecution and 
defense.
PROCEEDINGS IN THE ECCC: FITNESS 
TO STAND TRIAL DELAYS CASE 002
The Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) is currently 
conducting a series of hearings regarding 
the fitness to stand trial of some of the 
defendants in Case 002. Case 002 involves 
four leaders from the Khmer Rouge regime 
of 1975 to 1979, Noun Chea, Ieng Sary, 
Khieu Samphan, and Ieng Thirith. They 
have been indicted on multiple charges, 
including crimes against humanity and 
genocide. The court’s review of Noun 
Chea, Ieng Sary, and Ieng Thirith’s fitness 
to stand trial has significantly delayed the 
start of the trial. While a defendant has a 
right to be able to competently participate 
in his or her trial, the inability to try viola-
tors of human rights due to health concerns 
may undermine victims’ access to justice.
Rule 81 of the ECCC states that the 
defendant has a right to be present at his 
or her trial. Furthermore, the Cambodian 
Constitution embraces the UN International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
which requires in Article 14 that defendants 
be able to participate in their own trial. A 
defendant who is mentally or physically 
incapable cannot stand trial. The ECCC 
has ruled that a defendant may request 
a health evaluation, as per Prosecutor v. 
Strugar, a decision of the Trial Chamber of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In Strugar, the 
ICTY held that a certain level of mental 
cognizance is required for a defendant to 
“effectively exercise” his procedural rights. 
Thus, the purpose of these fitness hearings 
is to determine if a defendant can stand 
trial. If the court finds the defendant unfit, 
the decisions of the ICTY can help guide 
the court in determining how to handle 
permanently unfit defendants.
Concerns regarding the defendants’ 
health were first raised in March 2008 
when Noun Chea requested the appoint-
ment of an expert to gauge his fitness to 
stand trial. The court denied this motion on 
the grounds that the defense did not present 
enough evidence to warrant the appoint-
ment of an expert. Internal Rule 32 of the 
ECCC states that the court may appoint 
an expert to determine if a defendant is 
“physically and mentally fit to stand trial” 
because the defendant has a procedural 
right to be capable of understanding and 
present for the litigation.
In 2011, Noun Chea, joined with Ieng 
Thirith and Ieng Sary, again requested the 
appointment of an expert to evaluate their 
fitness to stand trial. The order was granted 
and Dr. John Campbell, a geriatrician from 
New Zealand, evaluated the health and fit-
ness of both Ieng Thirith and Noun Chea, 
while Ieng Sary was denied an evaluation. 
Dr. John Campbell examined Noun Chea 
and Ieng Thirith and appeared before the 
court from August 29 – August 31, 2011 
to answer questions. While the court has 
yet to make a final decision on both defen-
dants, Dr. Campbell’s findings will likely 
weigh heavily in the decision because of 
the ECCC’s inability to conduct its own 
thorough health assessment with a full 
understanding of the medical issues.
Dr. Campbell’s report found Noun Chea 
fit to stand trial. However, it is likely that 
the defense will continue to raise health 
concerns regarding his mental and physi-
cal ability. Dr. Campbell’s report on Ieng 
Thirith states that she is likely suffer-
ing from Alzheimer’s disease and short-
term memory loss, and recommends that 
she undergo further psychiatric testing to 
determine if she is fit to stand trial. He 
does not think she is currently fit to stand 
trial, and he believes she is unlikely to 
improve. Once affirmed by the Supreme 
Court Chamber, a decision that a defendant 
is unfit to stand trial is final and terminates 
proceedings against the defendant. Thus, 
there is a substantial likelihood that Ieng 
Thirith’s trial will never progress past the 
pre-trial stage.
If Ieng Thirith is declared permanently 
unfit, the ECCC will face a unique deci-
sion, with jurisprudential repercussions 
not merely for the ECCC itself, but for 
the entire international criminal justice 
landscape. Unlike in Strugar, where the 
defendant declared unfit died three months 
later from terminal cancer, Ieng Thirith’s 
Alzheimer’s is permanent, but not ter-
minal; she could survive for years rather 
than months. If unfit, the court is likely 
to release her to a health facility or to her 
family, with restrictions placed on her 
movement. However, it is possible she will 
outlive the mandate of the ECCC, in which 
case it is unclear if any potential restric-
tions placed on her would continue to have 
a legal effect.
The trial against all four defendants 
will start in late November. However, if 
proceedings against Ieng Thirith are halted, 
there may be no redress for the victims 
of Khmer Rouge’s brutal regime, many 
of whom continue to suffer from health 
issues. Many victims of the Khmer Rouge 
are in a similar physical and mental condi-
tion as Ieng Thirith but do not have access 
to the same standard of health care. While 
it is important to balance the rights of the 
defendant, it is important not to lose sight 
of the fact that these defendants allegedly 
led a brutal, genocidal regime whose vic-
tims are still suffering ill consequences. 
While the ECCC strives to respect the 
rights of the defendants, justice for the 
victims should not be forgotten.
Michelle Flash, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers the Internationalized 
Tribunals for the Human Rights Brief.
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